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ConvergenceWhile poverty reduction remains central in the Post-2015 Agenda, its determinants remain debated in
the literature, especially the role of structural conditions related to governance. This paper provides an
assessment of two key dimensions: the global adoption of MDGs and state capacity. We do so by studying
whether they facilitated convergence in income poverty measures, using cross-section and panel meth-
ods, with data on 89 developing economies for the period 1990–2013. We find that poverty headcount
and gap measures tended to decrease faster in countries with initially higher income poverty. Such con-
vergence accelerated after 2000, suggesting that MDGs adoption was instrumental to poverty reduction.
However, this still leaves unexplained substantial variation in poverty reduction performance across
countries. Such variation is explained by state capacity: countries with greater ability to administer their
territories in 1990 experienced faster income poverty reduction and were more likely to have achieved
the MDG target. This result is insensitive to robust regression methods and to a large set of controls (ini-
tial level of income, dependence on natural resources, education and health inputs, dependence on for-
eign aid, ethnic fractionalization, regional effects and a set of governance variables). As good
governance and effective institutions are included in the Sustainable Development Goals, this result pro-
vides empirical justification for this move, suggesting that more effective states could be crucial to sus-
tain the development progress achieved so far.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) period has just
ended, this is the time to assess successes and failures, trying to
learn lessons to inform the next set of global development goals
and policies. Between 1990 and 2015, as many as 1 billion people
have been lifted out of poverty around the world (UNDESA, 2015).
However, the determinants of achieving the MDG goal of halving
poverty remain debated in the literature, especially the role of
structural factors related to governance conditions. In particular,
it is not clear which governance dimensions matter and the evi-
dence on their significance remains mixed (Dalgaard & Erickson,
2009; Fiszbein, Kanbur, & Yemtsov, 2014; Kwon & Kim, 2014;
Smith & Haddad, 2015; Sumner & Tiwari, 2009). In the last twodecades, much poverty has been reduced, even in countries like
Uganda and Bangladesh, which ranked poorly in a wide range of
governance quality indicators, challenging the view that there
may be no ultimate ‘‘governance trap” (Asadullah, Savoia, &
Wahiduddin, 2014; Mahmud, Asadullah, & Savoia, 2013; McGee,
2000). Nonetheless, key policy reports and development agencies
routinely emphasize improved governance as a key pathway to
achieving the MDG goals by 2015 (e.g. see United Nations
Millennium Project, 2005). At the same time, the global adoption
of MDG targets per se, which is an element of global governance,
is likely to have mobilized political consensus around the agenda
of poverty reduction and provided a focus for policy advocacy
(Fukuda-Parr, 2011; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011; Hulme, 2015;
Waage et al., 2010).1moralize
3 Kelley and Simmons (2015) argue that, once rulers realize that they are being
monitored, they may change their priorities to meet external expectations. They
discuss three mechanisms through which indicators can affect policy outcomes: (a)
they help to attract or retain domestic political support and hence influence national
policy making; (b) performance indicators can work through direct peer shaming; (c)
indicators may impact policy by activating transnational social pressure.
4 Poverty convergence is defined in proportionate, rather than absolute, terms in
Ravallion (2012). The presence of poverty convergence by the proportionate
definition implies that poorer countries tend to see larger relative reductions in their
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systematic re-assessment of the income poverty eradication
achievements, looking at the role of two key governance dimen-
sions. One is the role of changes in development policy at the glo-
bal level, i.e., assessing to what extent the adoption of the MDGs
had an impact. The second is at the national level: assessing the
role of state capacity, which is an under-researched aspect in the
recent debate (Savoia & Sen, 2015). The two are related, such that
it is appropriate to analyze them concurrently, because the effects
of changes in global governance may or may not be reflected in
individual countries’ poverty eradication policies and policy imple-
mentation, depending on the underlying governance conditions at
national level. This exercise is worthwhile, because income poverty
continues to be a key development goal in the Post-2015 Agenda
and because it improves our understanding of the structural condi-
tions that facilitated its eradication.
Apart from the development goals literature, such an assess-
ment contributes to the broader research agenda on good gover-
nance (Grindle, 2004), now seen as both intrinsically and
instrumentally valuable to development progress (Hulme, Savoia,
& Sen, 2015). It is instrumental to development, as academics seem
to agree that improving the design of rules and regulations, the
effectiveness of policies and the competence of public bodies is
key to improving economic development (e.g., Baland, Moene, &
Robinson, 2010). In the last two decades, research has been striving
to assess the effect of economic institutions on national income
levels or growth rates (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson,
2001). Recent arguments emphasize the role of state capacity
(Besley & Persson, 2011; Fukuyama, 2013). Much of this research
focuses on the effects on economic development (e.g., Dincecco &
Prado, 2013), but other development outcomes, such as poverty
and inequality, have received far less attention (Savoia & Sen,
2015).2 By focusing on poverty reduction, our paper also contributes
towards filling this gap. Also, existing research has often conflated
state capacity with state performance (Centeno, Kohli, & Yashar,
2017). It is important to distinguish between the two: the former
is about institutions and the latter is about outcomes. Our paper tries
to do that too, by considering the separate effects of administrative
and legal capacity on poverty reduction. Governance is also intrinsi-
cally valuable, because it is a development goal in itself in the Post-
2015 development framework, as Goal 16 of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). Therefore, understanding the role of gover-
nance deficits, and state capacity in particular, for income poverty
eradication may shed light on whether and how this choice could
support development progress in other SDGs areas.
An empirical analysis of income poverty eradication requires
examining whether (and how fast) differences in income poverty
levels among countries are narrowing. But should we expect them
to narrow? There are both ‘‘endogenous” and ‘‘exogenous” mecha-
nisms supporting the hypothesis of convergence in poverty levels.
Important exogenous mechanisms have to do with the influence of
former colonial powers through development cooperation and the
pressure from the international community through mechanisms
of global governance, such as the adoption of MDGs. Being compar-
ative, performance indicators like MDGs can influence state policy
outputs, as they facilitate the monitoring of state behavior and2 An important exception is Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe (2015),
showing that states with greater administrative capacity reduce child mortality and
tuberculosis prevalence. Imai, Gaiha, and Thapa (2010), and Tebaldi and Mohan
(2010), also offer evidence that upholding the rule of law and controlling corruption
reduce poverty levels. See also Cook (2006) for an early discussion pointing to the
importance of state effectiveness for achieving pro-poor growth and progress towards
the MDGs target of poverty reduction in East Asia. For evidence against the hypothesis
that good governance leads to poverty reduction, see Kwon and Kim (2014), which
finds that good governance only contributes to poverty reduction in middle-income
countries, not low-income ones.serve as a tool for international governance (Kelley & Simmons,
2015).3 Adoption of MDGs is also likely to have improved the target-
ing and flow of official development assistance (ODA), ensuring that
aid emphasizes human development and/or is disproportionately
allocated to countries that need to make the most progress on the
MDGs (Addison, Niño-Zarazúa, & Tarp, 2015). Moreover, MDGs
adoption has influenced national development plans, leading to the
introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (see
Seyedsayamdost, 2017). Early assessments have shown that these
are, on balance, important means for making progress on MDGs
(see Booth, 2003) and recent econometric evidence found that the
effect of ensuing policies has led to greater reductions in headcount
poverty and infant mortality (Elkins, Feeny, & Prentice, 2017). We
would thus expect that poverty convergence could have started or
accelerated with adoption of the MDGs and the ensuing renewed
effort to tackle poverty.
Regarding endogenous mechanisms, one should expect poverty
rates to converge across countries, since mean household incomes
across countries tend to converge and since growth in mean
incomes reduces the absolute incidence of income poverty
(Ravallion, 2012).4 Other mechanisms of poverty convergence could
derive from diminishing returns to antipoverty policy and how and
whether actors within the economy choose to tackle poverty. In
analogy with capital accumulation and income convergence, the
concept of diminishing returns could also be applicable to poverty
reduction, as the early ‘units’ of antipoverty measures are relatively
more effective and less costly to attain. It could be much less difficult
and costly to attain a lower level of poverty from an initially high
level than from a low level (see Noorbakhsh, 2007). For example,
in an economy with a high number of poor, it would be relatively
easy to target and reach recipients, and it should be easier to build
political support in face of widespread poverty. On the contrary,
antipoverty policy implementation could be more difficult if an
economy already has relatively low levels of poverty, as it could be
politically more difficult to prioritize poverty reduction interven-
tions. Poverty reduction could also be costly if the remaining poverty
is entrenched and in the form of traps. Regardless of which of the
above endogenous mechanisms is at work, we hypothesize that
countries’ capacity for poverty reduction, and hence eventual con-
vergence in poverty levels, is subject to structural governance condi-
tions concerning the institutional capability of states to deliver
policies benefiting their citizenry, i.e., state capacity. Therefore, pov-
erty convergence may be more pronounced in countries with greater
state capacity. We suggest that this effect could work through two
channels: through higher administrative ability when delivering
poverty-reducing policies (Bardhan, 2005, 2016; Bockstette,
Chanda, & Putterman, 2002; Evans & Rauch, 1999) and throughpoverty rate. Countries starting out with a high incidence of absolute poverty should
enjoy a higher subsequent growth rate in mean consumption and (hence) a higher
proportionate rate of poverty reduction. Using a sample of household income data
that covers about 90 developing countries between 1977 and 2007 and focusing on
the conventional poverty headcount ratio at $2/day, Ravallion (2012) does not find
evidence of convergence in poverty headcount ratios across countries. Cuaresma,
Klasen, and Wacker (2016), however, reexamine this hypothesis, arguing for a
specification based on absolute convergence and finding robust evidence of conver-
gence in absolute poverty headcount ratios and poverty gap measures. Furthermore,
Cuaresma, Klasen, and Wacker (2017), re-investigating Ravallion (2012), find that the
apparent absence of proportionate convergence was sensitive to including a group of
influential observations from the transition economies.
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nomic growth (Besley & Persson, 2011).
Whether MDGs adoption and state capacity have affected the
ability of economies with higher poverty levels to catch up with
economies with lower poverty levels (and how fast) is ultimately
an empirical matter. This paper lets the data speak for themselves,
providing a set of stylized facts as a base for future research. We
present results based on the notion of b-convergence, using a range
of international income poverty measures, part of the set of the
official poverty eradication indicators, with a sample ranging from
60 to 89 developing economies for the period 1990–2013. We find
that differences across countries have narrowed: both poverty
headcount and poverty gap measures tended to decrease faster
in countries with initially higher income poverty, regardless of
their non-poverty initial conditions, such as the initial level of
income, dependence on natural resources, dependence on foreign
aid, and ethnic fractionalization. However, the variation in the
speed of convergence seems to depend on whether economies
shared the same structural characteristics in terms of governance
conditions. Supporting our hypothesis, the evidence suggests that
the lack in the convergence process of any significant acceleration
after the adoption of the MDGs reflects the variation between
countries of national-level governance quality. In particular, we
show that for a number of developing countries, such as Nigeria,
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zambia, the failure to achieve the 2015
MDG target of halving poverty is significantly explained by the
challenge posed by poor state capacity: countries that suffered
from deficits in the ability to administer their territories in 1990
were less likely to have achieved the MDG target on poverty reduc-
tion by 2013.
Apart from contributing to the literature on global development
goals, this paper adds to a separate literature that has long been
interested in the idea of convergence. Traditionally, empirical work
has been concerned with convergence in national income levels
(e.g., Barro, 2015; Pritchett, 1997; Quah, 1993; Rodrik, 2013;
Sala-i-Martin, 1996). But recent analysis of convergence has also
extended to the evolution of other development outcomes, such
as health and education variables.5 However, the role of structural
factors facilitating or hindering convergence has not received suffi-
cient scrutiny, although it is an important aspect in determining
whether contemporary differences in development outcomes across
countries are transitory or permanent. This paper contributes
towards filling this gap with respect to income poverty eradication,
by focusing on governance conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
provides some descriptive statistics on the evolution of income
poverty across countries. Section 3 presents the econometric evi-
dence on whether differences in poverty levels across countries
are narrowing, while Sections 4 and 5 extend the analysis to the
role of state capacity and MDGs adoption. Section 6 concludes.5 Some empirical analysis looked at a broad range of standard of living variables –
covering up to four aspects: health, education, rights and infrastructure – and found
that these measures are generally converging (Kenny, 2005; Neumayer, 2003),
although this is (perhaps unsurprisingly) not the case when such variables are
measured using an achievement index (Hobijn & Franses, 2001). Other work
concentrated on specific variables. For example, Deaton (2004) and Canning (2012)
looked at the evolution of health, showing convergence in life expectancy across
countries. Noorbakhsh (2007) extended the concept of convergence to human
development, finding evidence of weak absolute convergence over the period 1975–
2002. However, findings from a long-run perspective seem to point to a partial
catching up between the OECD countries and the rest taking place in the 1913–1970
period, with an overall widening of the human development gap since 1870 (Prados
de la Escosura, 2015). Closer to the focus of this paper, Ortega, Casquero, and Sanjuán
(2016) showed that the countries’ capacity for convergence in human development is
subject to the level of corruption, and that convergence is more pronounced in
countries with lower levels of corruption.2. Data
This section introduces the key variables. It also offers cross-
national poverty eradication statistics, comparing countries at dif-
ferent stages of economic development.
2.1. Poverty eradication measures
We use four core international povertymeasures, as provided by
theWorld Bank (2015), with a sample ranging from 60 to 89 devel-
oping and emerging economies and the longest period of analysis
being 1990–2013. They are the poverty headcount and poverty
gap, both at 1.25$ and 2$ a day. The country list is the Appendix.
2.2. Trends in poverty eradication
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the difference between
initial and final poverty measures, and for their initial levels. On
average, there has been a reduction in poverty levels across all four
measures. However, the progress in poverty eradication, in terms
of both headcount and gap measures, has not been uniform. It
seems to increase as one moves from economies at a higher stage
of economic development to those at lower stages. Since the 1990s,
low-income economies have experienced the largest poverty
reductions by the end of the observed period. In a significant num-
ber of cases, the magnitude in poverty reduction is such as to indi-
cate significant progress towards achieving MDG Goal 1. An
important exception is the case of the poverty headcount ratio at
$1.25 a day in low-income economies, which seems not to have
decreased fast enough to half its initial level.
A second stylized fact is that the larger poverty reductions in
countries at lower stages of development, which are those showing
higher initial poverty, are allowing them to catch up with higher
income economies. This is suggestive of a process of equalization
in poverty levels across countries over time, which we investigate
further in the next section by offering econometric testing.6
3. Are differences in poverty levels among countries narrowing?
Having presented the data and stylized facts on the evolution of
poverty, this section provides econometric evidence on the exis-
tence and significance of poverty eradication. We proceed in two
stages. We begin by discussing the methodology. Then we present
the results from a range of convergence tests.
3.1. Methodology
We need methods allowing us to obtain evidence on progress in
poverty eradication and an appreciation of its speed, and to assess
whether structural conditions matter in this process. This requires
testing for b-convergence (as known in the literature on economic
growth): an approach capturing whether countries with higher ini-
tial poverty experience larger poverty reduction than less poverty-
ridden countries, and so tend to ‘‘catch up”, under different initial
conditions.7 The corresponding test, in its simplest form, is a regres-6 In Table 1, sample sizes between the change in poverty measures and their initial
level vary. But this does not affect the comparisons or change the above description.
Results obtained by comparing the same sample for both changes and initial levels
(not reported here, but available upon request) show little sensitivity.
7 Others have emphasized a different statistical notion of convergence (e.g., Quah,
1993): r-convergence, which looks at whether the cross-sectional dispersion across
countries is decreasing, and for which b-convergence is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition (see Sala-i-Martin, 1996). We do not pursue this approach, because it would
not allow us to focus on whether initial conditions matter for poverty convergence
and on estimating its speed, while both are interesting to assess the progress on
poverty eradication.
Table 1
Poverty trends: 1990–2013.
Mean SD N Max Min
Panel (a) – Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population): 2013–1990 change and initial level
Whole sample
Change 12.76 15.99 62 15.18 60.56
Initial value 27.55 28.09 82 86.08 0.00
Low income
Change 26.40 15.24 10 15.18 37.31
Initial value 69.39 15.32 13 86.08 33.46
Lower middle income
Change 16.88 18.73 20 11.16 60.56
Initial value 34.24 24.20 26 78.59 1.00
Upper middle income
Change 8.02 11.24 23 1.02 50.11
Initial value 13.09 16.43 31 63.53 0.15
High income
Change 0.58 1.12 9 1.23 2.11
Initial value 5.07 13.18 12 46.71 0.00
Panel (b) – Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population): 2013–1990 change and initial level
Whole sample
Change 14.03 14.22 62 8.33 71.05
Initial value 41.64 32.96 82 95.18 0.00
Low income
Change 16.07 10.31 10 6.70 34.28
Initial value 86.53 10.37 13 95.18 56.49
Lower middle income
Change 18.74 18.47 20 8.33 71.05
Initial value 53.78 27.79 26 89.31 3.98
Upper middle income
Change 13.04 12.10 23 2.03 57.28
Initial value 24.71 20.80 31 85.71 0.28
High income
Change 3.86 5.31 9 1.21 15.05
Initial value 10.44 18.70 12 67.11 0.00
Panel (c) – Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (%): 2013–1990 change and initial level
Whole sample
Change 6.54 9.80 62 13.75 36.64
Initial value 11.86 14.41 82 57.41 0.00
Low income
Change 16.92 14.04 10 13.75 36.64
Initial value 33.09 14.00 13 57.41 11.95
Lower middle income
Change 7.66 9.22 20 4.02 32.52
Initial value 13.77 12.64 26 47.74 0.31
Upper middle income
Change 3.68 5.95 23 0.40 21.89
Initial value 5.14 7.22 31 25.82 0.14
High income
Change 0.14 0.67 9 1.12 0.79
Initial value 2.07 6.02 12 21.12 0.00
Panel (d) – Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%): 2013–1990 change and initial level
Whole sample
Change 9.22 11.07 62 12.42 39.99
Initial value 20.57 20.24 82 68.76 0.00
Low income
Change 18.66 12.37 10 12.42 31.90
Initial value 50.51 12.79 13 68.76 24.83
Lower middle income
Change 11.72 12.28 20 6.22 39.99
Initial value 25.43 17.27 26 61.65 1.05
Upper middle income
Change 6.28 7.83 23 0.80 34.36
Initial value 10.29 11.47 31 44.86 0.18
High income
Change 0.71 1.27 9 1.24 2.33
Initial value 4.19 9.78 12 34.92 0.00
Notes: Data is from World Bank (2015). Countries’ income classification follows the World Bank system and refers to 2013. The final and initial values of each poverty
measure are taken at 2013 and 1990 circa, to obtain the largest number of observations.
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over time on a given poverty measure on the measure’s initial values
across countries. Let DPit denote the difference in poverty index (any
measure) in country i observed at both date t = 0 and t = D. A test
equation for convergence is then:DPit ¼ aþ bPi0 þ ei with i ¼ 1; . . . ;N ð1Þ
where a and b are parameters to be estimated and ei is a zero mean
error term. Eq. (1) tests whether economies with higher poverty
levels tend to experience larger absolute reductions in their poverty
74 M.N. Asadullah, A. Savoia /World Development 105 (2018) 70–82rates and so catch up with economies with lower poverty levels.8 A
negative (positive) estimate of the parameter b implies that there is
poverty convergence (divergence) and its magnitude expresses the
speed of convergence (divergence). In particular, Eq. (1) captures
the hypothesis of unconditional convergence, according to which
countries’ poverty rates converge with one another in the long run,
independently of their initial conditions – that is, differences are
transitory.9 Note that the case of Pakistan seems to be controversial. A recent analysis of
official poverty data between 1990 and 2010 shows how the estimates may be biased,
due to both technical flaws and to the ‘politics of measurement’. Hence, it seems
difficult to reach a definitive conclusion as to whether poverty was reduced and so
assess the extent of progress on MDG Goal 1 (Khan, Naveed, Samman, Sarwar, & Hoy,
2015). Note also that a significant number of developing economies in the World Bank
poverty database have missing observations. The sample size of this study is in line
with the most recent empirical exercises (e.g., Cuaresma et al., 2017; Ravallion, 2012)
However, as an anonymous referee noted, it could be that the missing observations
may disproportionally come from poor economies, often lacking the resources, the
political or governance conditions (e.g., on-going conflict) to collect, on a regular
basis, income surveys. The implications could be marginal or even stack the odds
against our hypothesis. The missing observations, in this case, are likely to come from
countries with low state capacity (see Williams, 2009), which would have high initial
levels of income poverty and presumably have seen little poverty reduction (or even
an increase) over the period 1990–2013. If the foregoing reasoning is correct, the
missing observations should be placed approximately in the top-right corner of Fig. 1,
together with Zambia, Nigeria, Lesotho, and Madagascar. This would confirm (or even
reinforce) the idea that poverty convergence is different for countries with different
initial governance conditions, and state capacity in particular.
10 Note that, as both our dependent variable and key explanatory variable are
approximations of their ‘true’ values, our regression estimates are likely to be affected
by measurement error. This, in turn, stacks the odds against our findings. Measure-
ment error in the initial value of poverty implies that the convergence parameter is
subject to attenuation bias, and so underestimates the true extent of the speed of
convergence in our regressions. Measurement error in the dependent variable, instead,
implies that the estimated standard error of the estimated b will be larger, hence
making it more difficult to reject to the null that the estimated speed of convergence is3.2. Unconditional convergence in poverty levels and poverty
eradication
Fig. 1 presents simple scatter plots for our four poverty mea-
sures. Unconditional convergence is apparent in all cases, therefore
suggesting that economies with higher poverty incidence in 1990
are expected to catch up with the economies having initial lower
poverty. However, the significance and speed of the convergence
process can be best assessed when referring to the regression
estimates.
Panel (a) in Table 2 reports unconditional convergence esti-
mates over the period 1990–2013 for poverty headcount and pov-
erty gap, both at 1.25$ and 2$ a day. The estimates show that
poverty levels have been converging since the 1990, with the coef-
ficients on initial measures both negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the one per cent level. In all regressions, measures of
goodness of fit suggest that initial poverty levels explain substan-
tial part of the variation in poverty reduction. To give an apprecia-
tion of the speed of convergence, consider the poverty headcount
ratio at $1.25 a day in 1990 in Mali (scoring 86.08) and Ecuador
(scoring 6.79). The two countries are both on the regression line,
but positioned nearly at its opposite extremes. According to the
OLS estimates, the expected reduction in poverty will be 1.829
 0.388  86.08 = 35.23 percentage points in the former case
and 1.829  0.388  6.79 = 4.46 in the latter. Such trends imply
that, after 23 years, the two countries are predicted to reach a pov-
erty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day of 86.08  35.23 = 50.85 and 6.79
 4.46 = 2.33, respectively. At this pace, it would take approxi-
mately three decades before Mali catches up with Ecuador. This
is indicative of a significant process of convergence, although a
slow one, where extreme poverty may still persist for generations.
What does this illustration suggest in terms of poverty eradica-
tion? Mali has reduced the poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day at
an average 1.53 points per year. At this pace, it is predicted to be at
86.08 38.29 = 47.79 by the end of the MDGs period, so missing the
target of halving the proportion of people in poverty, while it
would take approximately another 31 years to eradicate extreme
poverty altogether. The same simple arithmetic for Ecuador sug-
gests that its Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day is predicted
to be at 6.79  4.85 = 1.94 by the end of the MDGs period, so meet-
ing the target, while it would take approximately another 10 years
to eradicate extreme poverty altogether. Repeating this exercise for
the other indices leads to similar conclusions.
The foregoing illustrations fit the ‘typical’ country, on the regres-
sion line or close by. However, while they approximate well the8 Poverty convergence is defined in absolute terms in (1). It is a suitable statistical
model to test our hypotheses, as, by definition, this captures the idea of poverty
reduction and hence MDG Goal 1. Cuaresma et al. (2016) adopt this approach, arguing
that such a specification has important advantages, compared to the log specification
in Ravallion (2012) (i.e., based on poverty elasticity): (i) to be insensitive to low
poverty incidence; (ii) to be more appealing in policy terms (as policy makers are
usually interested in percentage point, not percentage changes of poverty rate); (iii) it
does not need the strong requirement that countries starting out with a high
incidence of absolute poverty should enjoy a higher subsequent growth rate in mean
consumption and (hence) a higher proportionate rate of poverty reduction (as
Cuaresma et al. (2016, p. 4) put it, ‘‘it requires that a country should be more likely to
reduce poverty from 60 to 30% than from, say, 4 to 2%”).trends of a significant part of our sample, our regressions may not
be able to explain the situation of a number of countries, which,
although showing similar levels of initial poverty, present substan-
tial variations in their poverty reduction achievements. For exam-
ple, take the following two groups of countries in Fig. 1: Nigeria,
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zambia; and China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Cambodia, and Pakistan.9 Initial headcount ratios at 1.25$ and 2$ a
day were similar in both groups. Yet, the latter group has been suc-
cessful in reducing poverty, the former has not.10 Could this reflect
the role of structural conditions, such as the governance environ-
ment? This is where we turn our attention in the next two sections.
4. Has poverty reduction accelerated with adoption of the
MDGs?
The results shown in Table 2 suggest that economies with
higher poverty incidence in 1990 are expected to catch up with
economies having initial lower poverty, independently of their ini-
tial conditions. But such trends, although welcome in terms of pov-
erty eradication, do not yet explain the considerable variation in
convergence and poverty reduction performance. What does
explain this variation? As discussed in Section 1, there are two
potential governance channels through which progress in poverty
reduction during 1990–2015 could be mediated. In this section, we
explore the first type of governance mechanism, which operates at
the international level. It is possible that the convergence process
may have changed pace since the year 2000. The adoption of the
MDGs, and the ensuing renewed effort to tackle poverty, could
have accelerated convergence and hence started a process foster-
ing poverty reduction.11 The corresponding testable hypothesis isnot different from zero. Apart from this, the results are generally insensitive to using
robust regression methods, such as Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (panel b in
Table 2), and to formal checks for influential and outlying observations. However,
DFITS statistics do signal thatMadagascar, Zambia, Nigeria, and Lesotho are potentially
influential for the fit of the poverty headcount ratios. Similarly, DFBETA statistics find
that Vietnam, China, and Pakistan are countries that appear influential for the
magnitude of the convergence parameter of the poverty headcount ratios.
11 While the MDG era has seen a significant decline in income poverty in the
developing world, the much larger decline occurred well before the MDG goal setting.
In the case of China, for example, which accounts for much of the reduction in global
poverty, the MDGs only contributed a relatively small amount of the country’s
progress. The consensus view is that the reduction in global income poverty is mainly
due to rapid growth, primarily in a few countries in Asia (Deaton, 2015; Fosu, 2017;
Lomazzi, Borisch, & Laaser, 2014).
Fig. 1. Initial level of poverty vs. subsequent change: headcount and gap measures.
Table 2
Unconditional poverty convergence: OLS and iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) estimates.
Dep. variable: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25
a day (PPP) (% of population)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2
a day (PPP) (% of population)
Poverty gap at $1.25
a day (PPP) (%)
Poverty gap at $2
a day (PPP) (%)
Panel (a): OLS estimates
Initial value 0.388*** 0.201*** 0.506*** 0.370***
(0.066) (0.053) (0.098) (0.067)
Constant 1.829*** 5.670*** 0.404 1.503**
(0.674) (1.321) (0.488) (0.587)
F-stat 34.941*** 14.139*** 26.939*** 30.004***
Adj. R-Sq. 0.471 0.219 0.534 0.458
Obs. 62 62 62 62
RMSE 11.628 12.563 6.690 8.145
Panel (b): IRLS estimates
Dep. variable: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25
a day (PPP) (% of population)
Poverty headcount ratio at $2
a day (PPP) (% of population)
Poverty gap at $1.25
a day (PPP) (%)
Poverty gap at $2
a day (PPP) (%)
Initial value 0.427*** 0.180*** 0.669*** 0.447***
(0.014) (0.033) (0.015) (0.018)
Constant 1.309** 5.808*** 0.172 0.836
(0.539) (1.747) (0.271) (0.514)
F-stat 1000.412*** 30.661*** 2121.633*** 642.623***
Adj. R-Sq. 0.942 0.327 0.972 0.913
Obs. 62 62 62 62
RMSE 3.011 8.670 1.617 2.821
Notes: The dependent variable is the 1990–2013 absolute change of each poverty measure. The final and initial values of each poverty measure are taken at 2013 and 1990
circa, to obtain the largest number of observations. Symbols *, ** and *** stand for significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively, two-tailed test. Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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MDGs, which is equivalent to testing whether the speed of conver-
gence b has been constant or has become larger in magnitude since
2000.
We do this by reinvestigating convergence with panel methods.
We form an unbalanced panel (with N > T) by dividing the period
under scrutiny into two (roughly 10-year) episodes: 1990–2000
and 2001–2013. Such temporal structures can capture whether
the speed of convergence was faster in the period immediately fol-
lowing the MDG adoption, as compared to the preceding historical
period. Our convergence regression in such a setting is:
DPit ¼ aþ b1Pit þ b2t þ b3tPit þ eit with i ¼ 1; . . . ;N and t ¼ 0;1
ð2Þ
The dependent variable in this case is the difference between
the final and the initial poverty measure over each of the two epi-
sodes and t is the time dummy, which takes value one to identify
the MDG period (2001–2013) and value zero corresponds to the
period leading to the MDG adoption (1990–2000), which is the
omitted category. The interaction term, between the time dummy
and the initial level of poverty, allows for testing for structural
change in the convergence parameters over time. According to
(2), the sign and magnitude of the effect of initial poverty levels
on its subsequent change depends on the historical period. Hence,
the marginal effect is b1 + b3 t. If both b1 and b3 are negative, it
would indicate that renewed policy efforts following the MDGs
adoption have boosted poverty eradication.Table 3
Unconditional poverty convergence before and after MDGs adoption: Pooled OLS and IRLS
Dep. Variable: Poverty headcount ratio
at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of
population)
Poverty head
at $2 a day (
population)
1 2 1
Panel (a): Pooled OLS estimates
Initial value 0.132*** 0.134** 0.077***
(0.044) (0.054) (0.026)
2001–2013 dummy 4.842*** 4.940*** 7.560***
(1.397) (1.414) (1.739)
Initial value * 2001–2013 dum. 0.004
(0.069)
Constant 1.110 1.154 1.164
(0.844) (0.804) (1.147)
F-stat 10.766*** 9.649*** 12.700***
R-Squared 0.177 0.171 0.173
Obs. 137 137 137
RMSE 8.668 8.700 9.836
Countries 89 89 89
b2001-2013 0.130**
Panel (b): IRLS estimates
Dep. variable: Poverty headcount ratio
at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of
population)
Poverty head
at $2 a day (
population)
1 2 1
Initial value 0.186*** 0.106*** 0.062***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
2001–2013 dummy 5.167*** 2.283* 6.861***
(1.040) (1.194) (1.385)
Initial value * 2001–2013 dum. 0.200***
(0.035)
Constant 1.750* 0.520 0.730
(0.893) (0.823) (1.280)
F-stat 53.528*** 82.177*** 17.477***
R-Squared 0.436 0.642 0.195
Obs. 137 137 137
RMSE 6.073 4.983 8.071
Countries 89 89 89
b2001-2013 0.306***
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute change in each of the two periods for each
tailed test. Standard errors in OLS regressions, in parentheses, are robust for arbitrary hTable 3 (panel a) presents Pooled OLS estimates for our four
poverty measures (they are a test of unconditional convergence,
when they do not control for any countries’ structural characteris-
tics). When such regressions include the interaction terms, they do
not seem to indicate that there has been any stronger convergence
for the 2001–2013 period, testifying of the insignificance of the
MDG adoption. Incidentally, such results are very similar when
the split the period of analysis in two identical sub-periods (i.e.,
1991–2000 and 2001–2010).
To conclude that the adoption of the MDGs has meant no
change in the pace of convergence would, however, be misleading.
Like the initial set of results presented in Table 2, this second set of
regressions also seems unable to explain the situation of a number
of countries which, although showing similar levels of initial pov-
erty, present large variations in poverty reduction experiences in
both periods. A re-examination of the regressions shows that the
finding that MDGs adoption had no effect on poverty convergence
is not a general one. The speed of convergence appears to be the
same as in the 1990s and the first decade of the next millennium,
because of the effect of influential observations. For example, Fig. 2
shows that the slope of the speed of convergence in the 1990s may
be driven by Turkmenistan, Mauritania, and Pakistan, which have
been able to achieve a higher-than-expected reduction in poverty
(given their initial level) in this decade. Similarly, in the first dec-
ade of the new millennium, the speed of convergence appears
slower, because of the poor poverty reduction performance (rela-
tive to their initial level) of a set of Sub-Saharan African economies:estimates.
count ratio
PPP) (% of
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day
(PPP) (%)
Poverty gap at $2 a day
(PPP) (%)
2 1 2 1 2
0.093*** 0.132* 0.140* 0.113** 0.123**
(0.034) (0.070) (0.082) (0.045) (0.055)
8.775*** 1.833** 1.985** 3.515*** 3.889***
(1.985) (0.811) (0.782) (1.018) (1.105)
0.031 0.017 0.021
(0.044) (0.126) (0.074)
1.743 0.336 0.404 0.682 0.851
(1.242) (0.567) (0.464) (0.667) (0.643)
10.415*** 3.993** 5.924*** 9.087*** 9.097***
0.169 0.097 0.090 0.151 0.145
137 137 137 137 137
9.861 4.872 4.890 6.124 6.144
89 89 89 89 89
0.061* 0.123 0.102
count ratio
PPP) (% of
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day
(PPP) (%)
Poverty gap at $2 a day
(PPP) (%)
2 1 2 1 2
0.062* 0.324*** 0.230*** 0.198*** 0.136***
(0.032) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
6.850*** 2.098*** 0.880** 3.804*** 1.992**
(2.212) (0.389) (0.404) (0.725) (0.890)
0.000 0.243*** 0.160***
(0.044) (0.029) (0.036)
0.726 1.050*** 0.533* 1.365** 0.572
(1.526) (0.326) (0.282) (0.634) (0.613)
11.492*** 174.44*** 252.37*** 60.190*** 76.096***
0.188 0.718 0.847 0.465 0.624
137 137 137 137 137
8.126 2.274 1.784 4.232 3.606
89 89 89 89 89
0.062** 0.472*** 0.295***
index. Symbols *, ** and *** stand for significant at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively, two-
eteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.
Fig. 2. Poverty headcount convergence in 1990–2000 (circles) and 2001–2013 (squares): with/without influential observations.
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and Príncipe.
When we formally re-estimate each of the above regressions
using iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS), giving zero
weight to such influential observations, the results (reported in
Panel (b) of Table 3) show that, post-MDG adoption, the speed of
convergence has significantly accelerated, often doubling, apart
from in one case. Incidentally, we obtain the same results when
using median regression (not reported here, but available on
request). This suggests, contrary to pooled OLS results, that the
adoption of the MDGs may well have translated into more effective
poverty reduction policies and therefore acceleration in the catch-
up process, but its effect may not be uniform across countries: as
indicated by the significant variation in poverty reduction perfor-
mance before and after the MDGs adoption. The implication is that
looking at the role of changes in global governance is insufficient to
explain the variation in poverty reduction experiences. This calls
for further investigation: could the foregoing results reflect the role
of structural conditions, such as the type of governance at national
level?12 We estimate: PiD  Pi0 = a + b1 Pi0 + b2 Gi0 + b3 Pi0 Gi0 + ei, where Gi0 is a measure of
governance quality in country i at t = 0. Hence, the speed of convergence is: b1 + b3 Gi0.5. What explains the convergence process? The state capacity
link
Results on unconditional convergence tests suggest that differ-
ences in poverty levels between countries may be gradually clos-
ing. While on average poverty measures have converged, the
average trends may still mask considerable variation in the experi-
ence of specific groups or individual countries. Similarly, changes
in global development governance, such as the MDGs adoption,
also seem to leave unexplained a lot of variation in poverty reduc-
tion performance. Would the poverty reduction process be faster
for countries with different structural characteristics? We investi-
gate this possibility with respect to aspects of governance quality
at national level, as the effects of changes of governance at the
international level may or may not be effectively reflected in indi-
vidual countries’ poverty eradication policies, depending on the
underlying governance conditions at national level needed to
accelerate poverty reduction. This implies allowing for an interac-
tion term between governance measures and the initial poverty
level in (conditional) convergence regressions. This is equivalent
to estimating a modified version of (1), which now includes amultiplicative term, thus becoming a conditional convergence
regression.12
Deficiencies in the national governance infrastructure may
reduce the ability of countries to deliver poverty-reduction policies
and to create an investment climate that stimulates economic
growth, thus also damaging prospects of poverty reduction
through an indirect channel. Hence, there could be no poverty
‘catch up’. But which governance dimension matters? The recent
literature has emphasized the role of states and their institutional
capability to deliver policies benefiting their citizenry, i.e., state
capacity. One argument has emphasized the capability to collect
revenues, and to build the legal infrastructure guaranteeing a
secure contractual environment, as two ‘pillars’ of economic devel-
opment (Besley & Persson, 2011). In particular, ruling elites that
face a stronger incentive to develop such capacities are subject to
a greater extent of constitutional limits on the exercise of their
power (Besley & Persson, 2011). We capture this as the value of
Constraints on the Executive from the Polity IV dataset in 1990
(Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011). This variable measures to what
extent the executive power is subject to institutionalized checks
and balances (on a scale from one to seven, where one indicates
unlimited authority of the chief executive and seven indicates
executive parity or subordination, with intermediate values indi-
cating moderate to substantial power limitations).
A second argument has stressed the capacity of states to resolve
coordination failures (Bardhan, 2005, 2016) and to administer their
territory in order to deliver goods and services to their citizens
(Evans & Rauch, 1999), where a longer history of statehood leads
to higher quality administration through experience (Bockstette
et al., 2002). The effect of length of statehood is captured by the state
antiquity index (v. 3.1), proposed by Bockstette et al. (2002) and
based on the intuition that longer histories of statehood lead to
higher quality administration, due to two types of effect. One is
due to learning-by-doing effects in the public administration, in
which case long-standing states, with larger pools of experienced
personnel, may do what they do better than newly formed states.
The second type of effect relates to the length of operation of state
institutions, which may support the development of attitudes con-
sistent with bureaucratic discipline and hierarchical control, mak-
Table 4
Conditional poverty convergence: accounting for the role of state capacity, OLS estimates.
Dep. variable: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Panel (a): poverty headcount
Initial value 0.324** 0.416*** 0.298** 0.497*** 0.068 0.252** 0.256* 0.098 0.356** 0.171
(0.141) (0.100) (0.139) (0.145) (0.222) (0.111) (0.131) (0.125) (0.141) (0.188)
State history 3.756 4.990 7.321 1.891 2.208 3.956 8.625 3.627
(4.304) (5.079) (6.768) (5.257) (6.648) (6.188) (10.434) (7.698)
State history * In. value 0.662*** 0.681** 0.596*** 0.635** 0.408** 0.426** 0.359* 0.393*
(0.229) (0.263) (0.195) (0.267) (0.191) (0.194) (0.209) (0.217)
Cons. on the Executive 1.602** 0.800 1.251 2.775*** 2.485*** 2.590**
(0.649) (0.595) (0.828) (0.805) (0.832) (1.129)
Cons. Exec. * In. value 0.020 0.001 0.026 0.031* 0.026 0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 50.645* 37.208 49.539* 18.194 59.853 74.027** 68.449** 64.490** 32.266 89.376
(25.747) (22.337) (25.989) (24.272) (42.052) (30.650) (29.819) (30.093) (29.958) (42.282)
F-stat 21.77*** 11.65*** 15.53*** 18.84*** 11.01*** 7.69*** 9.51*** 8.61*** 8.88*** 8.38***
Adj. R-Sq. 0.615 0.458 0.606 0.813 0.595 0.435 0.300 0.439 0.622 0.560
Obs. 60 60 60 52 48 60 60 60 52 48
RMSE 9.947 11.795 10.056 6.418 10.461 10.844 12.068 10.810 7.750 9.629
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel (b): poverty gap
Dep. variable: Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (%) Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Initial value 0.455** 0.662*** 0.605*** 0.762*** 0.031 0.360** 0.437*** 0.377** 0.560*** 0.003
(0.175) (0.148) (0.164) (0.131) (0.387) (0.143) (0.096) (0.141) (0.145) (0.241)
State history 1.253 3.003 4.886 3.338 2.900 4.258 6.707 2.304
(2.787) (3.434) (3.891) (3.013) (3.332) (4.010) (5.542) (3.875)
State history * In. value 0.758** 0.868** 0.868*** 0.815** 0.589** 0.627** 0.592*** 0.599**
(0.343) (0.401) (0.277) (0.388) (0.240) (0.277) (0.216) (0.284)
Cons. on the Executive 0.123 0.326 0.001 1.027** 0.394 0.703
(0.383) (0.413) (0.546) (0.461) (0.469) (0.649)
Cons. Exec. * In. value 0.044 0.069 0.092** 0.005 0.016 0.040
(0.066) (0.067) (0.045) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029)
Constant 25.538* 7.909 21.348* 7.414 10.539 39.847** 25.359* 38.554** 15.382 34.458
(13.239) (8.047) (11.607) (11.307) (18.102) (18.769) (13.208) (18.670) (18.485) (27.653)
F-stat 23.45*** 12.63*** 11.20*** 44.90*** 26.50*** 19.42*** 11.72*** 13.28*** 22.44*** 12.24***
Adj. R-Sq. 0.590 0.521 0.607 0.865 0.555 0.565 0.450 0.563 0.793 0.557
Obs. 60 60 60 52 48 60 60 60 52 48
RMSE 6.236 6.742 6.109 3.533 6.576 7.303 8.215 7.321 4.732 7.465
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the 1990–2013 absolute change of each poverty measure. The final and initial values of each poverty measure are taken at 2013 and 1990
circa, to obtain the largest number of observations. Symbols *, ** and *** stand for significant at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively, two-tailed test. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Regressions 1–3 control for the initial value of log per capita GDP (World Bank, 2015). Controls in regression 4 include the initial value of: log per
capita GDP (World Bank, 2014), secondary enrolment rate (World Bank, 2014), regional dummies (Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and North Africa), aid
per capita (World Bank, 2014), total natural resources rents as share of GDP (World Bank, 2015), immunization (DPT and measles as% children ages 12–23 months) (World
Bank, 2015) and ethnic fractionalization (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003). Regressions 5 control for Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality, Corruption in
Government (ICRG, 2012) and their interactions with the initial poverty level, as well as the initial value of log per capita GDP (World Bank, 2014).
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structed by observing state history over the period from 1 to
1950 AD. For each 50-year period, each country has been allocated
a score for the existence of a government above tribal level;
whether the government is locally based or foreign; and howmuch
of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this govern-
ment. The scores for each 50-year sub-period have been multiplied
by one another and then summed by weighting down the periods
in the more remote past.
The results (Table 4) show evidence of stronger (conditional)
convergence in countries with longer history of statehood. This
seems to unambiguously support the idea that states with a greater
ability to administer their territory and to resolve coordination fail-
ures created the conditions for a faster poverty reduction in the per-
iod under scrutiny.13 Therefore, addressing such failures may be an
important link between MDGs and the Post-2015 Agenda. We find13 Compared with the goodness of fit in Table 2 regressions, Table 4 regressions
show a substantial increase in R-squared, supporting the idea that initial conditions
explain a significant part of the variation in poverty reduction. This is especially the
case when introducing the state history-initial poverty interaction term.no similar evidence, instead, with respect to fiscal and legal capacities
of states. Such evidence does not deny the importance of fiscal and
legal capacities of states, which may well have a longer-term effect
on poverty through fostering economic growth or indeed consolidat-
ing state development. It rather more modestly suggests that, in the
period under scrutiny, aspects of administrative capacity over the
national territory have had a more prominent role in delivering pov-
erty reduction polices in the attempt to reach Goal 1.
What is the effect of having longer state history? The magnitude
of the speed of convergence is no longer constant, but depends on
the length of statehood in different countries. Using the estimates
from regressions 4, Figs. 3 and 4 calculate and report the estimated
effects of the convergence parameter on poverty at the observed
values of the length of statehood index. For all countries and poverty
measures, there is a significant poverty-reducing effect, ceteris par-
ibus. Countries starting with higher poverty levels have seen a lar-
ger reduction over 1990–2013, so converging to the poverty levels
of economies where poverty has been eradicated. However, coun-
tries with a longer state history have experienced a faster reduc-
tion in poverty and, hence, faster convergence. In particular, the
convergence parameter in the group of countries with the longest
Fig. 3. Poverty headcount: speed of convergence with changing length of statehood.
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that in the group with shortest state history, for the four poverty
measures considered. Among the countries that fall within the for-
mer group are: China, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Turkey. Countries
falling within the latter are Sub-Saharan African economies:
Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. Interestingly, most
of them are countries earlier identified (see Figs. 1 and 2) as cases
whose poverty reduction performance could not be explained by
convergence regressions, even when accounting for the effect of
MDGs adoption.5.1. Robustness checks
The above results are confirmed after conducting a series of
checks for robustness. The key results hold true when introducing
a series of controls to check whether the ‘‘state capacity effect” was
due to other omitted structural characteristics. These controls are
also important because natural constraints may hinder countries
from achieving the MDG targets as they approach their upper or
lower bound limits (Hailu & Tsukada, 2011). First and foremost,we control for the initial level of income, capturing the stage of
development (regressions 1, 2 and 3). Such results do not signifi-
cantly change when also controlling for regional dummies, depen-
dence on natural resources, education, and health inputs,
dependence of foreign aid, and ethnic fractionalization, as a proxy
for cultural heterogeneity (regressions 4). Second, we ask whether
the length of statehood-poverty interaction is the only one at work
(regressions 5). The length of statehood variable is historical in nat-
ure and may perhaps be considered exogenous. However, one
could argue that the state history characteristics affecting the
speed of poverty convergence could reflect some other element
of the governance environment. To capture this possibility, we
introduce further interaction terms constructed using the rule of
law, corruption in government, and bureaucratic quality indices from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2012). As a consequence,
the sign and magnitude of the length of statehood-poverty interac-
tion remain stable; its significance marginally changes in one case.
Finally, when we re-estimate the above regressions using IRLS and
median regression, the results (not reported here, but available on
request) show similar findings.
Fig. 4. Poverty gap: speed of convergence with changing length of statehood.
14 When assessed in non-income dimensions of poverty, the progress during the
MDG era has been less dramatic in terms of reduction in hunger, food security, and
malnutrition. In the case of South Asia, despite a steep decline in poverty, the region’s
share in the total number of undernourished population in the world has increased
(Sharma, Dwivedi, & Singh, 2016). Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the global
population of hungry people has increased. Convergence in multi-dimensional
poverty may be slower and more responsive to political factors such as governance
and state capacity. This issue is not addressed in our paper and is left for follow-up
research.
80 M.N. Asadullah, A. Savoia /World Development 105 (2018) 70–826. Conclusions
This paper offers a systematic re-assessment of the poverty
eradication achievements, by producing evidence on whether,
and how fast, economies with higher income poverty levels expe-
rienced larger reductions in their poverty rates, so as to close the
gap with economies with lower income poverty levels (i.e., poverty
convergence). We do so by focusing on the roles of MDGs adoption
and of state capacity. Adoption of the MDGs has led to the emer-
gence of a new norm of eradicating global poverty and has influ-
enced national development plans, e.g., with the introduction of
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011;
Hulme, 2015). Therefore, we test for a sample of developing coun-
tries whether MDGs adoption may have accelerated progress
towards halving poverty, comparing differences in poverty reduc-
tion in the period before (1990–2000) and after (2001–2013) adop-
tion. At the same time, we provide evidence on the impact of state
capacity, an under-researched aspect in the quest for the determi-
nants of MDG Goal 1, because the effects of MDGs adoption may or
may not be reflected in individual countries’ poverty eradication
policies, depending on the ability of their states to design and deli-ver policies. State capacity deficits may reduce the ability of coun-
tries both to deliver poverty-reduction policies and to create an
investment climate that stimulates economic growth, so also dam-
aging the prospect of poverty reduction through an indirect chan-
nel. With this exercise, we contribute to the broader literature on
the analysis of the MDGs as instruments of achieving specific glo-
bal development targets (e.g., Dalgaard & Erickson, 2009; Fiszbein
et al., 2014; Fukuda-Parr, Greenstein, & Stewart, 2013; Hailu &
Tsukada, 2011; Sumner & Tiwari, 2009; Waage et al., 2010), offer-
ing new evidence on the income poverty-reducing effect of MDGs
adoption and showing that such an effect depends also on the
quality of national governance.14
M.N. Asadullah, A. Savoia /World Development 105 (2018) 70–82 81Our cross-section and panel convergence regressions, covering
up to 89 developing economies during 1990–2013, find evidence
of unconditional convergence in poverty headcount and gap mea-
sures (in line with Cuaresma et al., 2016, 2017). When comparing
the periods before and after the MDGs adoption, the results show
that that the speed of poverty convergence accelerated, so suggest-
ing that MDGs adoption was instrumental to poverty reduction.
Such findings are good news for halving poverty targets and for
the Post-2015 Agenda, where the goal of reducing global poverty
remains central.
However, such results also leave unexplained significant varia-
tion in poverty reduction performance across countries. To explain
this, we look at the role of state capacity. Conditional convergence
estimates find that, for a significant number of developing coun-
tries, the variation in poverty reduction performance is indeed
explained by the challenge of poor governance at national level:
the ability of states to administer their territory seems to be a
structural characteristic that can accelerate the poverty ‘catch-up’
amongst economies. Countries that suffered from such state capac-
ity deficit in 1990 were less likely to have achieved the MDG target
on poverty reduction. Our results suggest, in line with previous
studies (e.g., Cingolani et al., 2015; Cook, 2006; Harttgen &
Klasen, 2013; Imai et al., 2010; Kwon & Kim, 2014; Smith &
Haddad, 2015), that the quality of governance matters for achiev-
ing the MDGs. However, documenting the impact of state capacity
and identifying it as a structural condition facilitating poverty
reduction are significant points of departure from previous
findings.
As good governance and effective institutions are included in the
Post-2015 development goals, this result provides empirical justi-
fication for this move, suggesting that states with a greater ability
to administer their territory created the conditions for faster pov-
erty reduction. The main lesson for the Post-2015 Agenda is that
effective states could be crucial to sustain development progress
achieved so far.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of countries.Albania ALB Ghana GHA Nigeria NGAArgentina ARG Guatemala
GTMPakistan PAKArmenia ARM Guinea GIN Panama PAN
Azerbaijan AZE Guyana GUY Papua New Guinea
PNG
Bangladesh BGD Honduras
HND
Paraguay PRYBelarus BLR Hungary HUN Peru PER
Belize BLZ India IND Philippines PHL
Benin BEN Indonesia IDN Poland POL
Bhutan BTN Iran IRN Romania ROMTable A1 (continued)Albania ALB Ghana GHA Nigeria NGABolivia BOL Ivory Coast
CIVRussia RUSBosnia-Herzegovina
BIHJamaica JAM Rwanda RWABotswana BWA Jordan JOR São Tomé and
Príncipe STPBrazil BRA Kazakhstan
KAZSenegal SENBulgaria BGR Kenya KEN Sierra Leone SLE
Burkina Faso BFA Kirghizstan
KGZ
Slovak Rep. SVKBurundi BDI Laos LAO Slovenia SVN
Cambodia KHM Latvia LVA South Africa ZAF
Cameroon CMR Lesotho LSO Sri Lanka LKA
Central African
Republic CAF
Lithuania LTU Sudan SDNChile CHL Macedonia
MKDSwaziland SWZChina CHN Madagascar
MDGTanzania TZAColombia COL Malawi MWI Thailand THA
Costa Rica CRI Malaysia MYS Tunisia TUN
Croatia HRV Mali MLI Turkey TUR
Czech Rep. CZE Mauritania
MRT
Turkmenistan TKMDominican Republic
DOMMexico MEX Uganda UGAEcuador ECU Moldova MDA Ukraine UKR
Egypt EGY Morocco MAR Uruguay URY
El Salvador SLV Mozambique
MOZ
Venezuela VENEstonia EST Namibia NAM Vietnam VNM
Ethiopia ETH Nepal NPL Zambia ZMB
Fiji FJI Nicaragua NIC Zimbabwe ZWE
Georgia GEO Niger NERReferences
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